Banking in the shadows: a comparative study of China and India by Arora, Rashmi & Zhang, Q.
  
 





Recent years have seen the increasing concern for the flourish of shadow banking in China 
and India. In this paper, we aim to get a better understanding of the differences in trends 
and investigate the factors leading to the rise of shadow banking in these two major 
emerging economies. We find that financial exclusion is a common factor leading to the 
rise of shadow banking in China and India. While financial reform has taken place in 
India, financial repressive policies still prevail in China. Although several regulatory 
measures have been adopted in India and China, the size of the shadow banking in these 
two countries remains underestimated. Thus, streamlining and enhancing data collection is 
a key priority for both India and China. We also argue that the regulation in both countries 
should be more activity focused rather than sector or entity based, and it should be at par 
with banks. As shadow banks provide last mile connectivity and enhance financial 
inclusion, a balanced approach is required keeping in view both benefits and costs of the 
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“Looking back to the year 2007/08… it’s striking that the crisis did not at first look like a traditional banking 
crisis, but rather one related to a new phenomenon: shadow banking” (Turner 2012). 
 
“If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and acts like a duck, then it is a duck…What about an institution 
that looks like a bank, acts like a bank and behaves like a bank? Is it a bank? Often it is not a bank – it is a 





The global financial crisis (GFC), which began in the US and other developed countries in 
2007, gradually spread to the developing and emerging economies through the channels of 
trade, remittances and capital flows (Mishkin 2010).
1
 According to the decoupling 
hypothesis, developing countries were not supposed to be impacted by the crisis; but the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 proved this to be wrong (Kose et al. 2008). As 
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) argued, “Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 generated a 
very direct financial shock to emerging markets as trade credit evaporated and international 
trade declined sharply and uniformly around the world”. The emerging and developing 
economies decoupled until mid-2008. However, subsequent developments in the US and 
Europe led to their recoupling accompanied with “revised expectations about the real 
effects of the crisis … on output in both industrial and emerging markets” (Dooley & 
Hutchison 2009). Also, as Eichengreen et al. (2012) suggest the fact that a major financial 
institution such as Lehman brothers was allowed to fail, undermined the confidence and 
trust in the financial system. They conclude,  
The heightened co-movement at least in part reflected incomplete knowledge about the magnitude of 
toxic asset positions in these relatively early stages of the crisis and hence, raised the possibility that 
instability could spread more quickly and widely than assumed in the consensus view. In the event, 
Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail, after which the sensitivity of the CDS spreads of global banks as 
a group experienced heightened sensitivity to the whole range of economic and financial variables. As 
those variables deteriorated, the result was a perfect storm.     
The shadow banks have played a pivotal role in escalating the crisis, and this particularly 
holds for the US.
2
  In the US alone, shadow banking assets constituted about 48% of global 
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 Interestingly, the spillovers from the developed countries occurred not only during the crisis, but have been 
taking place afterwards too as the monetary and fiscal stimulus measures to contain the crisis are being 
withdrawn (Lim et al. 2014; Eichengreen, et al. 2014; Mishra et al. 2014; Rajan 2014). 
2
 The term ‘shadow banking’ was first coined by McCulley in 2007 with reference to the US financial sector, 
where shadow banks (non-banks) were recognized as major players in the run-up to the global economic crisis 
(Ghosh et al. 2012). McCulley (2007) defined shadow banks as “the whole alphabet soup of levered up non- 
banking investment conduits, vehicles, and structures.” Its origin however, can be traced much earlier to 
D’Arista and Schlesinger (1993) who termed it as a ‘parallel banking system’. 
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shadow banking assets in 2011 declining to 43.5% in 2013 and further to 40.4% in 2015. In 
terms of size, shadow banking assets in US were highest at 13.8 US$ trillion in 2015 
followed by Cayman Islands (4.4 US$ trillion) and Japan ($ 3.2 trillion) (FSB 2016a). Oncu 
(2016) argues that shadow banking is “essentially an Anglo-American phenomenon” as 
North America, Europe and UK put together account for about 80% of shadow banking in 
all the regions. 
Compared with developed countries, shadow banking in developing and emerging countries 
have uncomplicated structure and smaller size. According to Ghosh et al. (2012), factors 
underlying the rise of shadow banking in these countries include tight regulations and 
monetary and financial stability concerns. For example, recent years have seen growing 
concerns for the rise of shadow banks in many countries especially China and India (Ghosh 
et al. 2012; UN 2013; Li 2013). In China’s case, along with the country’s unprecedented 
economic growth, shadow banks have experienced significant growth (Ghosh et al. 2012; Li 
2013). For India, the size of shadow banks, mainly registered non-banking financial 
companies (hereafter NBFCs), is relatively small, less sophisticated and fairly well 
regulated, yet it is growing rapidly. Thus concerns have been raised over its sustainability 
and impact on the economy (Sinha 2013; Acharya et al. 2013). 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the differences of shadow banking in two major 
emerging economies - China and India. Specifically, we seek to answer three questions: (1) 
what is the extent of shadow banking in China and India; (2) what factors contribute to its 
rise, are there any common ones; and (3) is there adequate regulation on shadow banking in 
these two countries. Although a number of studies have emerged on shadow banking in the 
context of developed economies such as the US and European countries, surprisingly there 
are hardly few studies that focus on emerging economies (Farid 2012).
3
 Moreover, hardly 
any study has examined the patterns and trends of shadow banking in India and China. The 
reason to conduct such a study is quite obvious. China is now the second largest economy. 
Along with India, these two countries contributed around 15.5% of global GDP in 2016 
(IMF 2016). It is crucial to get a better understanding of their financial systems and the 
vulnerabilities therein as it could pose potential risks for global financial stability. Our paper 
shows that financial exclusion is a common factor leading to the rise of shadow banking in 
China and India. In terms of differences in finance policies, still repressive and highly 
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 For a review of literature see Adrian & Ashcraft (2012), Pozsar (2008) and Pozsar et al. (2010). 
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regulated policies in the financial sector in China and loosening of controls in India both 
prompted the rise of shadow banking.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly lays down our theoretical 
analysis on the emergence of shadow banking. Section 3 examines the trends and patterns in 
the rise of NBFCs in India. Section 4 looks into the shadow banking in China. Section 5 
presents a comparative perspective and investigates the factors leading to the rise of shadow 
banking in both countries. Section 6 concludes. 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Due to the complexity of the rise of shadow banking in emerging countries, developing a 
theoretical framework is quite an onerous task. We start our analysis with the neoclassical 
theory. According to this theory, an individual or a firm’s prime concern is to maximize 
utility and profits. It also assumes that players are rational and make decisions based on full 
and relevant information. In line with these assumptions, capital is perfectly mobile and can 
move in any directions subject to returns. However in reality, the free movement of capital 
is constrained by factors, such as asymmetric information (which may lead to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard); segmentation of credit markets and weak institutions 
(He et al. 2017). Asymmetric information could cause credit rationing, that is, the lender 
may provide credit only to few borrowers and avoid lending to risky ones; high monitoring 
costs also prevent banks from lending to small and poor borrowers (Besley 1994; Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981). For example, in developing countries, rural credit market faces problems 
such as collateral scarcity, less developed institutions, market segmentation and poor 
enforcement. Shadow banks including informal financial services such as moneylenders, 
pawnbrokers and other informal sources of finance emerge to fill in this gap in the financial 
sector. Compared with formal institutions which may be located at a distance, informal 
financial institutions are in close proximity to borrowers (e.g. they may be in the same 
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 Shadow banks in turn lead to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard as they emerge in the periods 
of ‘low uncertainty’ and provide credit to risky borrowers (Moreira and Savov 2017). Gennaioli, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2013) too show that shadow banks which emerge during the “quiet times” and enable risk 
diversification for the banks contribute to build up of excessive risks and fragility of the financial system.    
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Regulatory arbitrage is another factor giving rise to the shadow banking. As Buchak et al. 
(2017) suggest:   
The narrative is that banks are subject to an ever-increasing regulatory burden, heightened legal 
scrutiny, and larger capital requirements, which have affected which products they can provide and 
have changed the cost of their funding. Therefore, banks, especially those facing tighter capital 
constraints, are withdrawing from markets with high regulatory costs. Shadow banks, which are 
largely free of regulatory costs and such concerns, then step into this gap.  
According to Fleischer (2010), regulatory arbitrage is “a perfectly legal planning technique 
used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs” and 
involves overcoming legal constraints, transaction costs, professional, ethical and political 
constraints. Regulatory arbitrage can take place under three circumstances: inconsistent 
regulatory regime under different regulatory regimes; reducing regulatory costs in a single 
regime and finally regulatory arbitrage to take advantage of future upcoming regulatory 
changes (Fleischer 2010). Shadow banking in many countries has emerged from taking 
advantage of differential regulatory regimes for banking and non-banking institutions 
(Buchak et al. 2017). 
Financial innovation and technology also gives rise to the shadow banking. As mentioned 
earlier, neo-classical economics hypothesizes that market participants make rational and 
fully informed decisions with a view to maximizing their utility, so markets reflect the 
aggregate preferences of these participants. Viewed from this perspective, the extreme 
interest volatility of the 1970s and early 1980s can be seen as having spurred demand for 
innovations such as interest rate swaps and adjustable rate mortgages (Blair, 2010; Hu, 
1993; Van Horne, 1985). As Awrey (2013) comments, innovation is a rational response to 
market imperfections. Tighter regulation by the financial regulator on banks also triggers 
innovation to circumvent regulation (Frame & White 2004).  
Among various innovations, financial technology (fin-tech) stands out as a typical 
example. It enables financial institutions to overcome problems, particularly asymmetric 
information, through techniques such as alternative credit scoring methods (Frame and 
White 2004). On the other hand, scholars have found that fin-tech has a significant effect 
on shadow bank growth. For instance, Buchak et al. (2017) show that for the US, growth of 




SHADOW BANKING IN INDIA
5
 
In India, banks are the major financial intermediaries. Recent statistics show that up to 
March 2017, the formal financial sector comprised of 21 public sector banks, 21 private 
banks, 3 local area banks, 10 recently established small finance banks, 6 payment banks, 44 
foreign banks, regional rural banks, cooperative banks and non-banking financial 
companies (NBFCs). Alongside the formal financial sector, informal financial sector also 
exists such as moneylenders, share broking firms, loan brokers and traders and multani 
shroffs (RBI 2002).  
Financial sector reforms, which are still ongoing, were initiated in 1991. However, despite 
several reforms, state ownership of banks still exists and 72.7% of the total banking assets 
are held by public banks (Arora and Wondemu 2018). Further, mandatory priority sector 
lending requirements continue to exist and all banks are expected to meet the targets. 
Priority sector target initially formalized in 1972 currently stands at 40% of bank credit for 
domestic commercial banks and foreign banks.
6
 Prior to April 2011, banks were allowed to 
on-lend to NBFCs (for further lending to priority sectors) and these were classified as 
priority sector loans. However, since April 2011 this has been withdrawn (Acharya et al. 
2013).  
Shadow banks in India are mainly registered NBFCs (Gandhi 2014). According to Bhaskar 
(2014), NBFCs are defined as companies engaged in the business of making 
loans/advances, acquisition of shares/securities, hire purchase finance, insurance business 
and chit fund activities. To reduce ambiguity, the country’s central bank introduced a 50-50 
business criteria rule in 1999, according to which, a registered company (registered with 
RBI) is treated as an NBFC if its financial activities constitute more than 50% of the 
overall assets and gross income of an entity (RBI 2011). This rule, however, leaves out a 
large number of firms including informal sector entities such as pawn brokers and 
moneylenders. These companies undertake financial activities, but their assets or income 
do not meet the 50-50 criteria. As a result, they are not registered with the RBI, and are 
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 Among the criteria employed by the emerging economies in identifying non-banking financial intermediaries 
are their economic activities, extent of credit intermediation, maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage 
activities, interconnectedness with the financial system and extent of systemic risks (Financial Stability Board 
2014). 
6
 Priority sector lending is lending to selected sectors which may not otherwise receive adequate credit and 
includes sectors such as agriculture, MSMEs, education, social infrastructure and renewable energy. While 
foreign banks with 20 or more branches are expected to meet the 40% target, those with branches less than 20 
are expected to meet this target in a phased manner by 2020.  
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either poorly regulated or fall outside the regulatory perimeters. 
Historically, NBFCs in India have been in existence for a long time. Even prior to the 
country’s independence in 1947, a complex indigenous financial system consisting of 
banias, chettys, sahukars, podars and shroffs provided finance to different sectors and 
population.
7
 Besides these, moneylenders were also the primary source of finance 
including pukka moneylenders, kaccha moneylenders, pawnbrokers and goldsmiths, 
qistias, military moneylenders and amateur moneylenders (Tandon 1990). These 
indigenous bankers and moneylenders were different from the banks, primarily because 
they combined other business with banking and money lending and their operations were 
informal (Tandon, 1990). The role of the moneylenders varied across different parts of the 
country. In northern and central India, the moneylenders had a hold on the peasantry, 
particularly the small and marginal farmers. While in southern India, they financed trade 
and served agriculturists during the colonial period (Bose, 1994). Thus historically non-
banking financial intermediaries have played an important role in providing finance to 
different sectors. Although the NBFCs in various forms have existed even before the 
independence, the term NBFC was first introduced in the early 1950s with the 
establishment of Sundaram Finance, a company financing purchases and sale of cars 
(Acharya et al. 2013). 
The annual growth of other financial intermediaries (OFIs) according to FSB (2016a) was 
18.4 % in 2015.
8
 This places India among the top 5 emerging economies experiencing high 
growth rates in shadow banking in 2015. Others are Argentina (45.6%), China (36.6%), 
Russia (21.8%) and Turkey (17.8%).
9
 Figure 1 shows rising trend of OFI assets in India. 
Based on RBI data, NBFC assets (including assets of all NBFCs) as a proportion of GDP 
were 8.4% in 2005-06 and rose further to 12.9% in 2014-15. During the similar period, 
bank assets formed 75.4% of GDP rising to 96.4% of GDP in 2014-15 (Bhaskar 2014; 
Mohan and Ray 2017).  
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 The words ‘bania’, and ‘sahukar’ in Hindi language means the local shopkeeper. They played an important 
role in informal financial markets during the British rule and post-independence. Despite considerable 
expansion of institutional credit since 1969, the economic and political power of sahukars remains substantial. 
During the British period, sahukars remained the link between the natives and the British. It provided for the 
sale and financing of agricultural operations, and acted as buyers of agricultural products and also as agents for 
collecting taxes. Even now sahukars dominate informal credit markets in parts of India and charge usurious 
rates of interest (Rahul, 2003). 
8
 OFIs are defined by Financial Stability Board as those financial institutions “that are not central banks, banks, 
insurance corporations, pension funds, public financial institutions, or financial auxiliaries.” 
9
 Although Argentina has the highest growth rate, it is the third smallest among the emerging economies in 




Source: Computed from FSB (2016a). 
Figure 1: Trends in OFIs assets in India 
 
Figure 2 shows the complex structure of NBFCs in India. According to RBI (2014), these 





















Source: Adapted from RBI (2014). 
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On the basis of liabilities, they have been categorized into deposit-taking and non-deposit 
taking NBFCs. Deposit-taking NBFCs, unlike banks, are only allowed to accept time deposits 
with a minimum maturity of one year. According to RBI (2016a), the total number of NBFCs 
registered with RBI, as of March 2016, was 11,682 of which 202 were deposit-accepting and 
11,480 were non-deposit companies. Because of the increasing regulations on deposit-taking 
NBFCs, there is a sharp decline in their numbers. This is reflected in their smaller share of 
assets in contrast to the rising share of non-deposit taking NBFCs, especially those that are 
systemically important, as Figure 3 shows.  
 
 
Figure 3: Assets (in Rs. trillions) of deposit taking and systemically important non-deposit 
taking NBFCs 
Source: Acharya et al. (2013).  
 
Further, Figure 4 shows that loans and advances constitute the largest proportion of the total 






Figure 4: Asset structure of deposit taking and non-deposit taking NBFCs 
 
Source: Adapted from Gandhi (2014). 
 
Regarding liabilities, the most important components are owned funds, debentures and bank 
borrowings as at end March 2014 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Liability structure of deposit taking and non-deposit taking NBFCs 













On the basis of activities, NBFCs have been classified into loan companies, investment 
companies, asset finance companies and infrastructure finance companies. In recent years, 
new entities such as infrastructure finance companies, infrastructure debt funds, micro-
finance institutions have been added to this group.  
NBFCs have also been classified with their asset size and systemic importance. Since April 1 
2007, non-deposit taking NBFCs with assets of Rs. 1 billion (limit raised to Rs. 5 billion 
since December 2014) and above, referred as NBFC-ND-SI, have been classified as 
systemically important (RBI 2014). They are crucial to financial stability because they hold 
linkages with the rest of the financial system. Most of the NBFC-ND-SIs are in infrastructure, 
microfinance and financial services catering to medium and large industries and transport 
sector. 
A number of large NBFCs have been established by the corporate sector. These large NBFCs 
operate as conglomerates covering a range of areas such as insurance, broking and mutual 
funds (FSB 2016b). Besides NBFCs of the private sector, government owned NBFCs both at 
the central and state level also exist. Bank borrowings to these NBFCs were Rs. 385 billion as 
of 2014 (RBI 2014). Despite the fact that they are highly leveraged, these NBFCs are not 
under prudential regulatory requirements of RBI; and therefore pose risks for the stability of 
the financial system.
10
   
Overall, Table 1 shows that a relatively small number of companies (3.8 % of NBFCs whose 
size of assets are above Rs. 1 billion) disproportionately hold nearly 90% of the total assets. 
Within this group, companies whose asset size is above Rs. 5 billion are considered 
systemically important (as mentioned earlier, NBFCs above Rs. 5 billion have been classified 
as systemically important by RBI). Table 2 also shows that, apart from the NBFCs with more 
than Rs. 1 billion assets, a large number of others (around 85%) co-exist which are much 
smaller in size. Although these smaller NBFCs, do not pose a major risk to systemic stability, 
yet as RBI (2014) argues “they give rise to issues with regard to consumer protection as well 
as reputational risks for the regulator”. 
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 According to FSB (2016b) the leverage ratio for these companies is 6.4 compared to 3.3 for the entire sector. 
These government NBFCs are only subject to rules and norms of the relevant government ministry to which 
they are attached. 
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Table 1: Size wise distribution of NBFCs registered with Reserve Bank (Rs. billion) 













500 Million to 1 billion 686 490 5.7 3
.
8 
Up to 500 million 9555 854 79.4 6
.
6 
Data not available 1334 NA 11.1  
Source: RBI, 2014. 
Due to high level of non-performing assets (NPAs), recent years has seen the deterioration of 
the asset quality of the NBFC-ND-SIs. According to Figure 6, the deterioration measured 
with gross NPAs/advances ratio has experienced considerable increase from 1.5 % in June 
2012 to nearly 2% in September 2014 and further to 4.4% in 2016.  
 
         Source: RBI (2014). 
 
Figure 6: Asset Quality of NBFCs-ND-SI 
 
Another concern is the interconnectedness of NBFCs to the rest of the financial system. Table 
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Table 2: Exposure of Banks, Asset Management Companies and Insurance Companies to top 
NBFCs (Rs. bln) 
 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Sep-14 
Banks 1513 1453 2919 1495 
AMCs 83 624 756 912 
Insurance Companies 780 880 965 1023  
Source: Bhaskar (2014). 
The exposure of asset management companies to NBFCs has increased more than tenfold 
from Rs. 83 billion in 2012 to Rs. 912 billion in 2014. Among major reasons for increased 
borrowings of NBFCs from different institutions are economic reforms including financial 
sector reforms and on-lending by banks through NBFCs to meet priority sector requirements 
(Sherpa 2013; Acharya et al. 2013). 
The interconnectedness between banks and NBFCs in India was further exposed during the 
GFC in 2008. Before the crisis, the banks, which had a low number of branches in semi-
urban areas, were on-lending to the NBFCs for further lending so they can meet mandatory 
priority sector lending targets (Acharya et al. 2013). The crisis, however, led to the drying up 
of credit from the private sector banks because their deposits fell sharply and moved to public 
sector banks. As Acharya et al. (2013) put it, this withdrawal of liquidity appears to be a 
“shadow bank run” on the NBFCs, resulting from a “run” on the private sector banks 
(transmitted to the NBFCs through bank loans) and mutual funds (transmitted to through 
commercial paper). 
The regulation of Indian NBFCs, which has undergone significant changes over the years, 
was introduced earlier on in the 1960s. The ASSOCHAM report (2016) observed that, “the 
evolution of the regulatory framework for NBFCs in India has gone through a cyclical phase-
from simplified regulations to stringent and extensive regulations and finally towards 
rationalization as part of the recently revised NBFC regulatory framework.” Regulation was 
necessary for three major reasons: ensuring efficacy of credit and monetary policy, 
safeguarding depositors’ interest, and ensuring healthy growth of NBFIs (Sinha 2013). 
Several committees were appointed by the government timely to examine the regulatory 
standards of NBFCs.
11
 Stringent regulation of the sector came in 1996, and subsequently in 
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 These include Bhabatosh Datta Study Group (1971), James Raj Study Group (1974); Chakravarti Committee 
(1985), Narasimham Committee  (1991),  Shah  and  Khanna  Committee  (1992, 1993) and Second 
Narasimham Committee (1998). 
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1998 as a result of the failure of one large NBFC, they were not allowed to raise deposits 
from the public. Because of these regulations, the number of deposit taking NBFCs declined 
significantly over the years from 1420 in 1997-98 to 428 in 2005-06, 280 in 2009-10, and 
further to 241 in 2014. As Table 3 shows, regulation monitoring is performed through market 
intelligence, complaints, industry sources and reports of the statutory auditors. 
 
Table 3:  Monitoring of NBFCs by Reserve Bank of India 
 




NBFC-D Quarterly (more granular) Yes Yes 
NBFC - ND (below or 
equal to INR 5 billion) 
Annual (less granular) None No 
NBFC – ND-SI (above 
INR 5 billion) 
Quarterly (more granular) Yes 
INR 5-10 bl: rotation 
INR 10-20 bl: every 2 years 
Above INR 20 bl: annually 
Source: FSB, (2016b). 
The GFC once again highlighted the importance of regulating NBFCs as regulatory arbitrage 
and the interconnectedness of the financial system increased in recent years. In 2010, a 
working group was constituted to revisit issues and concerns of NBFCs. It recommended that 
minimum net owned funds should be stipulated to start a NBFC, and small NBFCs (non-
deposit) that is, those below asset size of Rs. 500 million, should be exempt from RBI 
registration. Minimum net owned funds of the existing NBFCs therefore, was increased to 20 
million which is expected to be achieved in March 2017 (RBI 2014). In 2006, Tier I and Tier 
II capital adequacy requirements were introduced for systemically important non-deposit 
NBFCs at 10%, later increased to 15% of their aggregate risk weighted assets. The capital 
adequacy of these NBFCs has been much above the minimum requirement. For the deposit-
taking NBFCs, it is 12 or 15% depending on their function (Acharya et al. 2013). Meantime, 
credit rating has been made compulsory for the existing unrated asset finance companies 
(AFCs) by March 31, 2016 (RBI 2014). The classification of non-performing assets was 
changed to 90 days as in the case of banks, instead of previously 180 days. Furthermore, 
NBFCs with less than Rs. 5 billion assets will not be subject to prudential requirements.  
Recent reforms also include streamlining of procedures, for instance, the number of 
documents to be submitted by the NBFC applicants has reduced to 7-8 from 45 documents 
earlier. Figure 7 shows the regulatory structure of deposit and non-deposit accepting NBFCs 
15 
 
in India. According to figure, there are multiple regulators of NBFCs, with the regulation 
being institution focused rather than financial product focused. Overall, India’s regulations 
over NBFCs are based on the acceptance of deposits and systemic importance. The two major 
criteria are accepting public funds and having customer interface. However, despite these 
NBFC reforms, considerable differences between the banks and NBFCs regulatory regimes 
continue to exist. For example, statutory reserve ratios and various prudential measures which 
are enforced on banks are not applied to NBFCs. This is indeed a great concern because as 
previously mentioned, a large number of NBFCs are either not registered or are below the 
threshold limits.  
 
Source: Bhaskar (2014). 
 
Figure 7: Regulatory Structure of NBFCs in India 
 
 
SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA 
Similar to India, banks are the major financial intermediaries in China with bank assets 
forming more than 310% of GDP or nearly 68% of country’s financial system assets by the 
end of 2016 (IMF 2017).
12
 Large commercial banks, mainly the big four banks (International 
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 Banking institutions include commercial banks (large commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, city 
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Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank 
of China), continue to form large proportion of total banking sector assets and 115.4% of 
GDP.  
One unique feature of China’s financial sector is that despite the recent growth of private 
banks, the state is the ‘promoter, owner and regulator of the financial system’ (IMF 2017). 
This massive state presence accompanied with implicit state guarantees has led to many 
problems such as inefficient allocation of resources, high level of NPAs, moral hazard and 
buildup of risks in the financial system (IMF 2017). According to Zheng & Xiong (2018), it 
also breeds other problems such as soft budget constraint reflecting heavy lending to state 
owned enterprises at low interest rates, repressed financial system and political intervention 
depriving private firms of access to bank credit. In China, besides formal financial sector, 
informal financial sector also exists such as non-banking financial companies and shadow 
banks. 
Compared with India, the definition of shadow banking in China is much broader and aligns 
more closely with FSB. According to the Circular 107 issued by the Chinese government, 
shadow banking is defined as “credit intermediation entities and activities outside the 
traditional banking system” (Huang 2015). This definition, however, does not take into 
account the different risks and vulnerabilities attached to shadow banking such as the 
interconnectedness between formal banking system and shadow banks (Barth et al. 2015, Lu 
et al. 2015). 
Shadow banking in China has a long history. According to Lan (2015), pawn broking 
activities existed as early as in the Six Dynasties era (317-589 AD). Pawnbrokers in those 
days collected collateral in exchange for loans (Jiang 2009). Buddhist temples were also 
authorized to run pawnshops. Similar to India, money houses came into existence in the 19th 
century in Pingyao, Shanxi province (Hsu 2012). However, pawn broking firms and money 
houses were abolished in the later years; and nationalization of rural credit cooperatives took 
place in 1958. After economic reform in 1978, informal finance re-emerged, and has since 
then flourished in the past several decades (Hsu 2012). 
In contrast to India, the fast-growing shadow banking sector in China is much larger in size, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
commercial banks, rural commercial banks and foreign banks), policy banks & China Development Bank, 
cooperative financial institutions, new type rural financial institutions & China Postal Savings Bank, other non-
bank financial institutions regulated by CBRC and banking asset management companies.  
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posing potential risks to the financial system. According to the FSB (2016a) estimates, non-
banking financial intermediaries or Other Financial Intermediaries (OFIs) assets as a 
proportion of GDP in China formed 25.9% in 2013 rising to 71.1 in 2015.
13
  Comparatively, 
this was substantially lower than 294.2% in the United Kingdom and 144.9% of GDP in the 
US in 2015. The figure varies considerably based on the methodology followed by individual 
studies as Table 4 shows. 
Table 4: Estimates of the size of shadow banking system in China 






% of bank assets 
(year end 2012) 
GF Securities 17/12/2012 30 4.8 57% 31 
Citi Research 11/1/2013 28 4.5 54 29 
Barclays Dec 2012 25.6 4.1 49 27 
Hua Tai Securities 14/12/2012 25 4.0 48 26 
UBS 16/10/2012 13.7- 
24.1 
12.2-3.9 26-46 14-25 
ANZ Bank Dec 2012 15-17 2.4-2.7 29-33 16-18 
Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch 
6/7/2012 14.5 2.3 28 15 
Source: Li (2013). 
A trend which can be seen clearly from Figure 8 is the rising assets of OFIs in China - from 
5.3 billion in 2002 to 7.7 trillion in 2015. It registered the largest increase among the BRICS 
including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Among components of OFIs (finance 
companies, money market funds and special finance vehicle), finance companies recorded the 
highest increase over the period 2007-2011 in China (33%), Hong Kong (12%), India (25%) 
and Indonesia (24%). 
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 Other financial intermediaries as defined by FSB are non-banking financial institutions excluding insurance 
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                     Source: Constructed from FSB (2016a). 
Figure 8: Assets of OFIs in China 
 
According to Hsu et al. (2013), shadow financial system in China consists of three groups. 
The first group comprises commercial banks, investment banks (includes bank-trust 
cooperation in financial products), finance leasing companies and insurance brokerage firms. 
The second group includes quasi financial institutions such as micro-loan companies, pawn 
shops. The third group covers informal financial institutions such as private money houses, 
money brokers and internet borrower-lenders. Sheng et al. (2015) place shadow banking 
activities into three groups based on their regulatory coverage: i) those with a finance license 
that lack full regulation such as commercial banks, securities companies, trust funds and 
insurance companies; ii) those with no finance license and lack of regulation for instance, 
financial leasing companies, guarantors, pawnshops and microfinance companies; and finally 
iii) those which do not have a finance license and face no regulation (internet finance 
companies and underground banks including third party WMPs). 
In contrast to India, China’s classification of shadow banking activities is more 
comprehensive.  It not only includes various financial products, cooperation between banks, 
trusts and security companies, but also covers small loan companies, finance guarantee 
corporations, internet finance companies, pawnshops and moneylenders. While for India, 
these informal lenders are not known as part of the shadow banking system. This could be 
perhaps, because they are small in size and therefore, not considered as a threat to financial 
stability (FSB 2016b). The reason why they are included in China’s shadow banking system 
may lie in the high interconnectedness to the rest of the financial system (Hsu et al. 2013).
14
  
One participant among the shadow banks in China are commercial banks who lend funds to 
trust and investment companies (Sharma 2014). Banks also hold controlling shares in trust 
companies (Li 2013). Another interesting channel is that of lending by large state owned 
enterprises (who get funds from banks at low interest rates) to small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). These entrusted loans are given by one corporation to another using the bank as an 
intermediary. They do not enter banks’ balance sheets as banks charge fees for the services 
rendered. On its part the bank monitors the usage of the loan of the borrower. Such entrusted 
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 Some studies however, do not take the informal sector into account due to its heterogeneity and potentially 
low risk (Li, Hsu and Qin 2014). 
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loans have been existed since 1996, but it is only recent years that these loans started flourish 
along with China’s unprecedented economic growth. Apart from that, commercial banks also 
offer products such as trust products, negotiable securities, credit default swaps, wealth 
management products (WMPs), etc.  
For example, WMPs are developed and managed by banks or channeled through other firms. 
Usually they have short-term maturity and high returns. Banks use these funds to invest in 
securities mainly in search of yields. According to recent estimates, the outstanding stock of 
WMPs exceeded 17 trillion Chinese Yuan as of 30th June 2014 forming around 26% of GDP 
(Perry and Weltewitz 2015).  
The pure WMPs managed and controlled by the banks without involvement of other financial 
institutions formed 11% of the total outstanding WMPs in 2014. The interest rate offered on 
these WMPs is higher than that of bank deposits and are a balance sheet item of the bank. 
Besides sole bank managed WMPs, banks and trusts also jointly manage WMPs. These can 
be of three types: direct bank-trust cooperation products, indirect bank-trust cooperation 
products and collective trust products. Around 55% of WMPs are in direct and indirect 
cooperation between banks and trusts. For the collective trust products, the trusts are the 
active managers of WMPs and banks do not have them on their balance sheets. 
Among the risks associated with WMPs are the high interest rates offered to investors above 
the deposit rates. As the WMPs are offered by the banks (or jointly with trusts), they also 
carry implicit bank guarantee, and a high potential risk in case of default. Meantime, because 
these funds are usually invested in sensitive sectors such as real estate, risks can be escalated 
even further (Perry and Weltewitz 2015). The pure bank WMPs, on the other hand, offer 
explicit bank guarantee, and invest in low risk financial products such as government bonds, 
inter-bank loans and high quality corporate bonds. The risks associated with unguaranteed 
bank WMPs are the mismatch of maturity between WMPs, which are of short-term nature, 
and on-lend to long-term projects. The maturity mismatch exists for each individual WMP 
separately leading to enhanced rollover risks as several WMPs could mature at the same time. 
The lack of transparency in WMPs is another risk. As the banks are involved in the issue of 
WMPs directly or indirectly as an intermediary, they are considered implicitly guaranteed 
and risk free. This is compounded by the fact that the banks are government owned. As many 
of these are off-balance sheet activities, they not only pose significant risks to the banking 




Peer-to-peer (P2P) online lending is another recent innovation in shadow banking both in 
China and India. According to P2P finance association, cumulative global P2P lending was 
4.4 billion GBP by the end of 2015 up from 2.2 million GBP in 2012 (RBI 2016a). The 
number of P2P online platforms in China has increased from only 50 in 2011 to 2520 in 
2015. Total transactions under this category were 120 billion RMB (US$ 18.8 billion) in 
2015 (Canuto and Zhuang 2015). Financing through P2P platform has contributed to a stock 
market bubble when the loans borrowed by the individual borrowers were invested in the 
stock market compelling the regulators to ban P2P lending for stock market purchases 
(Canuto and Zhuang 2015). Similar to other shadow banking products, the downsides of P2P 
lending in China include absence of central bank liquidity support, maturity mismatch, 
systematic risks, and guarantees of high returns similar to WMPs.  
In India, P2P lending is also emerging gradually. The country’s central bank, RBI, recently 
acknowledged that, “although nascent in India and not significant in value yet, the potential 
benefits that P2P lending promises to various stakeholders (to the borrowers, lenders, 
agencies etc.) and its associated risks to the financial system are too important to be ignored” 
(RBI 2016b). Accurate data on the number of P2P companies is not available for the country; 
but there are around 30 start-up P2P lending companies, much lower than that of China (RBI 
2016b). These are largely tech companies registered under the Companies Act and they act as 
an intermediary between the borrower and the lender. RBI currently proposes to bring P2P 
lending under its regulatory perimeters by defining P2P lending platforms as NBFCs. 
Similar to India’s NBFCs, shadow banks in China are also closely interconnected to the 
banks. In fact, as discussed earlier, the state owned banks is a significant participant in the 
shadow banking system, and regulatory arbitrage has been a compelling factor in this role. As 
Sharma (2014, p.343) points out: 
Indeed, the formal banking sector has conspicuously utilized and created shadow banking services by 
exploiting loopholes in the regulatory and supervisory frameworks which limit their activities – as 
illustrated by the example of commercial banks acting as agents for the shadow banks by selling WMPs 
(for hefty transaction fees) to raise funds for Zhenfu Energy. For their part, official banks are also happy 
to channel or ‘outsource’ funds to trust companies, which in turn lend to small enterprises and businesses 
that generally have difficulty obtaining credit from commercial banks. 
 
The probable risks attached with shadow banking in China include higher liquidity, solvency 
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risks and mismatch of maturities. For example, mismatch between raising funds through 
short-term wealth management products and investing in long-term projects and speculative 
real estate (Lu et al. 2015). What’s more, the decline in overseas export demand could 
potentially hurt SMEs and their capacity to repay loans mostly borrowed from shadow banks. 
Furthermore, the interconnectedness between shadow banks and the banking sector is high 
and vulnerable to shocks, and could lead to disruptions and systemic crisis. Adequate external 
supervision and regulation is therefore crucial for a stable financial system. 
Circular 107 has been an important step in the regulation of shadow banking in China (State 
Circular 107). In a balanced approach, it acknowledges that shadow banking plays a positive 
role in the economy, supports traditional banking system in providing financial services, and 
has enhanced financial development of the country through innovative financial products. 
Meanwhile, it also took into account the potential systemic risks of shadow banking (Huang 
2015). 
The Circular adopts an entity based approach in sharing the regulatory responsibilities- it 
assigns shadow banking products to different regulators based on their area of responsibility 
(Huang 2015). For example, the China Banking Regulatory Commission regulates and 
supervises banks and trust companies, including banks’ and trusts’ WMPs; the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission regulates and supervises securities and futures markets; 
and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission regulates and supervises insurance 
companies, including the activities of their asset management subsidiaries (Huang 2015). 
Local governments also regulate some shadow banking activities.  
However, this policy, as defined by Circular 107 of “separate operation, separate regulation”, 
has a number of problems. For example, multiplicity of regulators of the same product leads 
to regulatory inconsistencies and arbitrage (Huang 2015). The Circular also fails to deal with 
new innovative shadow banking products which may not fall within the perimeter of any 
regulatory agencies. As Huang (2015) observes, “There is a mismatch between China’s 
regulatory structure and the underlying market it regulates, which has affected the efficacy of 
the regulation by creating regulatory inconsistency, gaps and overlaps”. 
Among other steps that have been taken to regulate and monitor the non-banking financial 
sector in China, the State Council outlined that the country’s central bank, the People’s Bank 
of China, will assess risks arising from the non-banking financial sector and that the 
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collection of data on these entities/products would be a priority. This data and information 
will be shared among the regulators. Shadow banking entities are further required to establish 
mechanisms for internal control, risk management and risk segregation in accordance with 
risk bearing capacity. It is also stipulated that financial institutions, especially commercial 
banks, must separate WMPs business from their other businesses. Overall, in the recent years 
many regulatory measures have been adopted by the government to regulate shadow banking 
in the country. 
 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: INDIA AND CHINA 
15
 
Financial deregulation vs financial repression 
Scholars argue that financial repression is a major driving factor behind the rise of shadow 
banking in China (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao 2015; Hachem and Song 2015). This includes 
caps on lending volumes, interest rate restrictions including deposit rate ceilings, 75% loan-
to-deposit limit for banks, entry barriers and high reserve requirements on the banking 
system.
16
 Financial repression has encouraged regulatory arbitrage by the banks 
circumventing regulation through shadow banking. 
Although the ceiling on lending rates and floor on deposit rates for all financial institutions 
were abolished in 2004, the ceiling on deposit rates and the floor on lending rates continue to 
exist, leading to a mismatch between savers’ and borrowers’ expectations (Gao 2015). 
Hachem and Song (2015) also note that the loan to deposit ratio varies by banks. For the Big 
Four banks -, it tends to be lower reflecting large portfolio of wealth management products. 
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 Some studies have also noted differences between factors responsible for the rise of shadow banking between 
the US and China. For instance, Li (2013) states that, in contrast to the rise of US shadow banking, which was a 
consequence of financial liberalization, Chinese shadow banking system rose as a result of tight regulatory 
regimes following the GFC. The structure of shadow banking in China is bank-centric with active participation 
from the banks, whereas the US shadow banking activities exist mainly in the capital market (Dang, Wang and 
Yao 2014). Further, in contrast to the US where complex products such as derivatives and collateralized debt 
obligations were popular, China’s shadow banking system is relatively simple (Sharma 2014). Huang (2015) 
notes that in China “the relationship between the shadow banking system and the traditional banking system is 
more collaborative than competitive”. Another difference with the US shadow banking is the timing of its rapid 
growth. While the US shadow banking system grew prior to the crisis and was a major factor contributing to the 
financial crisis, in contrast, shadow banking in China grew rapidly after 2008 after a tight monetary policy was 
undertaken by its central bank (Huang 2015). Another difference was the demand for such financial services by 
individuals in the US in contrast to most of the demand originating from private businesses in China (Gao 
2015). 
16
 This 75% cap was however not uniform for all banks and was lower for the four biggest banks (Hachem and 
Song 2015).  
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In this sense, financial repression plays an active role in the rapid rise of shadow banking in 
the country. 
Other characteristics of financial repression also prevail in China such as barriers to entry for 
private sector banks and monopolistic state controlled banks. Nonetheless, at the same time, 
the flourish of shadow banks has weakened financial repression because it gives rise to an 
increased competition in the financial sector. This is reflected in the number of participants 
and innovative products (Gao 2015). Overall, poorly developed capital markets, lack of 
investment avenues and ceilings on bank deposit rates point to a fact that financial 
development in China is still low; and because of this, shadow banking products has 
flourished. Sheng et al. (2015) argue that imbalances in China’s financial system, that is, 
excessive reliance on bank credit and poor development of the capital market, has resulted in 
a gap and it is now filled by the shadow bankers. 
In contrast to financially repressive policies in China, significant financial sector reforms 
were carried out in India in 1991. The reform has led to interest rate liberalization, increased 
competition with the entry of a number of private and foreign banks, introduction of 
prudential norms, rationalization of bank branches and reduction in statutory ratios. The 
ongoing financial liberalization allowed loosening of restrictions on the major stakeholders 
such as commercial banks and NBFCs, which led to an increase in retail lending, 
infrastructure finance and rural lending. The volume of infrastructure finance by NBFCs 
alone increased by 26.2 % during the period March 31, 2010 - March 31, 2013 (Bhaskar 
2014). 
Role played by technology 
A common factor leading to the rise of shadow banking in both countries is the role played 
by financial technology. Major technologies include online origination platforms used by 
fintech firms and the use of big data in screening borrowers (alternative credit scoring data 
such as mobile phone usage, use of social media). The use of online platforms has made it 
possible for shadow banks (fintech firms) to lower their costs (for instance labour costs, 
transaction costs); provide products more tailored to the needs of borrowers and efficiently 
price the products (Buchak et al. 2017). At the same time online platforms have led to 
increased convenience among the borrowers reflected in the increased demand of such 
products. Examples of fintech platform are peer to peer lending platforms, crowd sourcing. In 
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India for example the number of startups in online lending increased from only 2 in 2013 to 
30 in 2015 (ASSOCHAM  2016).  
Financial exclusion of households and small businesses 
The failure of the mainstream banking to provide access to finance for households, SMEs, 
small borrowers and semi-urban and rural population, has been a major factor contributing to 
the growth of shadow banking in the two countries.
17
 Chinese banks, for instance, mainly 
cater to large firms rather than SMEs. Specifically, though SMEs account for over 97% of 
registered firms, employing about 65% of the workforce and contributing approximately 60% 
to GDP, it is the large state owned enterprises that receive over 75% of loans and support 
from state owned banks and government (Gao 2015; Tsai 2015). As Tsai (2015) noted, 
“indeed, one of the enduring paradoxes of China’s reform-era growth is its maintenance of a 
bank-dominated financial system that privileges lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
rather than the thriving private sector.” Thus, lack of adequate finance for SMEs has led to 
the rise of shadow banks in the country (Schwarcz 2013; Lan 2015). Overall, about 87% of 
the small enterprises, 53% medium enterprises and 40% of microbusinesses are borrowers of 
the shadow banking sector.  
There are many reasons why SMEs in China receive very little finance. One of these is the 
political concern. It can be seen in a number of ways such as using state sector including state 
commercial banks and state owned enterprises as a tool of social stability, running state 
owned enterprises with the objective of preventing mass unemployment, select development 
agenda of the government in targeting specific industries, limited capacity of bank loan 
officers to process credit applications of private sector, and also fear of job losses should the 
private businesses default (Tsai 2015).  
Individual characteristics of borrowers also determined access to the formal or informal 
sector. For example, those with better education, political connections, credit rating 
experience and holding businesses for longer lengths were more likely to borrow from formal 
channels (Zhang 2008).  
While capital market in India is fairly well developed, it is mostly accessed by large 
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 One can argue that a similar such exclusion exists in advanced economies such as US. For instance Buchak et 
al. (2017) showed in their study that shadow banks were playing a much larger role in lending to low income 
borrowers and minority borrowers, category of population shunned by the traditional banks. 
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corporates. SMEs, similar to China, face considerable difficulties in accessing finance (Allen 
et al.2012). The rise in shadow banking in India has been influenced by increasing demand 
for finance from the untapped sectors which are often overlooked by the mainstream banking 
especially in the rural areas. Strong demand in the rural areas for agricultural loans such as 
for farm equipment has had a sharp rise in number of NBFCs. Allen et al. (2012) observed 
that small firms in India increasingly rely on alternative or informal financing channels. 
Another study on micro SMEs by the International Finance Corporation noted large unmet 
needs of finance by SMEs in India (IFC 2012). 
The recent focus of the government and central bank on financial inclusion has also led to 
sharp increase in NBFC lending. Bhaskar (2014) argued that the NBFCs in India have played 
a ‘game changing role’ because they promoted financial inclusion. Gandhi (2014) noted that 
the NBFCs provided access to finance especially for the poor in rural and urban areas. 
Recently gold lending NBFCs have been playing an important role in providing finance to the 
underfinanced or excluded population particularly in the rural areas. FSB (2016b) in its recent 
review of Indian NBFCs acknowledged: 
Many NBFCs have been traditionally involved in serving borrowers excluded from the formal banking 
sector. Over time the lines of operation between banks and NBFCs became increasingly blurred and, 
more recently, NBFCs emerged as an important alternative source of credit intermediation. Many NBFCs 
nowadays compete with banks across a range of consumer financing segments, such as small business 
lending, asset finance and infrastructure finance. 
This positive role of NBFCs has also generated policy dilemmas such as balancing innovative 
and dynamic nature of the sector in providing ‘last mile connectivity’ and at the same time 
addressing risks therein (FSB 2016b). 
High economic growth 
Among other factors leading to the rise of shadow banks in China was the export-led growth 
model of the country, giving rise to an increased demand for finance by firms and businesses. 
China has experienced an annual average growth rate of 9 % since the 1990s (Makin and 
Arora 2014). A number of studies have mentioned that this high economic growth, in the 
absence of adequate support from the banking sector, was fueled by informal finance. With 
high growth rate and increased income, demand for investment products have increased 
significantly, leading to the emergence of investment companies (Li, Hsu and Qin 2014; 
Dang, Wang and Yao 2014). 
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Global financial crisis and shadow banking 
The policy stimulus measures adopted in China during the GFC period also pushed the 
growth of shadow banking in the country (Dang et al. 2014). The Chinese government 
implemented a policy stimulus package of around 4 trillion Chinese Yuan (approximately 
US$600 billion) (supported mainly with credit) in 2008 with 45% funding by the central 
government and the balance funded by the local governments (Sharma 2014; Hachem and 
Song 2015). Given the extensive regulations on the banking sector, it was the non-bank 
entities and off-balance sheet activities of banks that met the credit needs of the firms. 
Substantial funds were also provided to local governments for financing real estate and 
infrastructure projects through ‘local government financing vehicles’. It has led to substantial 
debt at the local level and mismatch of maturities between short-term borrowings and long-
term investment. 
In contrast to China, a different set of fiscal stimulus measures along with monetary measures 
was employed by the Indian government during the GFC. It includes tax relief and increased 
expenditure on public projects. Public sector banks were the major providers of credit during 
the crisis. Shadow banks started playing a major role only in the post-reform period following 
risk averseness and high NPAs of the banking sector. 
Other factors 
Other factors leading to the rise of Indian NBFCs include the increase in NPAs of the Indian 
banks and the fall in bank credit. Gross NPAs of scheduled commercial banks as a proportion 




    Source: RBI (2014). 
Figure 8: Trend in Gross NPAs as % of Gross Advances 
 
High level of gross NPAs can be mainly found in infrastructure sector, iron and steel, textiles, 
mining (including coal) and aviation (RBI 2014). With the increased risk aversion of the 
banks, NBFCs have filled this lending space and continue to provide credit to several sectors 
(Javadker 2017). ASSOCHAM Report (2016) also noted that “the success of NBFCs can be 
clearly attributed to their better product lines, lower cost, wider and effective reach, strong 
risk management capabilities to check and control bad debts, and better understanding of 
their customer segments.” Table 5 summarizes factors giving rise to the growth of shadow 
banking in the two countries. 
Table 5: A Comparative summary of factors giving rise to shadow banking in India and China 
India China 
Financial Deregulation- Interest rates liberalized Financial Repression - Controlled interest rates for 
depositors 
Financial exclusion of a large population - 
households and businesses 
Financial exclusion of population - mainly small 
businesses 
Demand from rural areas, SMEs Demand from SMEs 
Post 2008 crisis rise in NPAs of banking sector 
leading to fall in bank credit and rise in NBFC 

















NBFCs tightly regulated (still gaps), -NBFC 
regulation began in 1963 
Regulation initiated in recent years although still less 
regulated 
 High economic growth 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the recent years, shadow banking has flourished in both developing and emerging 
countries as well as developed countries. In this paper, we first investigated the trends, 
structure and causes for the rise of shadow banking in India and China. Then, we examined 
the differences between the two countries and factors leading to the rise of shadow banking. 
Differences in the regulation between the banks and shadow banks in the financial system 
have led to regulatory arbitrage. This particularly holds for China where regulatory arbitrage 
has been a major cause of the emergence of shadow banking. Interestingly, while financial 
repression was a driving factor in case of China, financial liberalization in contrast, was a 
contributory factor behind the rise of shadow banking in India. A common factor behind the 
rise of shadow banking in the two countries is financial exclusion. In both countries, SMEs 
and a large proportion of the population especially in the rural are financially excluded. 
NBFCs in India have played a significant role in providing finance to these excluded SMEs 
and households.  
Nonetheless, shadow banks are not regulated adequately, posing potential risks to the 
financial system. Several regulatory measures have been adopted in China lately to regulate 
shadow banking. While in India, although several prudential and regulatory measures are 
taking place, the size of the shadow banking remains underestimated - many firms not 
classified as NBFC (below the threshold limit) are outside the regulatory perimeters. On the 
other hand, there is also insufficient knowledge about firms with less than Rs. 5 billion (FSB 
2016b). Streamlining and enhancing data collection therefore, is a key priority for both India 
and China. For India, the norms for the regulatory perimeter (based on 50:50 criteria) for 
NBFCs and exemption of government owned NBFCs from a number of prudential measures 
should be reviewed (FSB 2016). What’s more, the regulation in both countries should be 
more activity focused rather than sector or entity based, and it should be at par with banks 
(FSB 2016b).  
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As shadow banks provide ‘last mile connectivity’ and enhance financial inclusion (Bhaskar 
2014), a balanced approach is required keeping in view both benefits and costs of the shadow 
banking system. While the benefits of shadow banking certainly involve increased access to 
financially excluded groups, sharing of risks and increased economic activity financed by 
diverse intermediaries in the periods of “low uncertainty” such as Great Moderation of early 
2000 (Moreira and Savov 2017), this however, at the same time leads to increased risk 
building (especially if these are neglected or poorly regulated), interconnectedness between 
the intermediaries resulting in increased fragility, instability and systemic showdowns 
presenting ultimately a “tradeoff between financial instability and economic growth” 
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